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We study Ramsey monetary and scal policy in a small scale New Keynesian model
where government spending has intrinsic value, public debt is state-noncontingent and the
scal authority is constrained by using distortive taxation. We show that Ramsey policy
is remarkably altered when consumption taxation is considered as a source of government
revenues alongside or as an alternative to labour income taxes. First, we show that the
optimal steady-state size of the public spending is, ceteris paribus, greater under consumption
taxation than under labour income tax. We further show that adopting consumption taxation
has enourmous long run welfare gains and that these gains are increasing in the level of
outstanding public debt. These welfare gains are not limited to the steady-state, but they
are also present in the dynamic stochastic equilibrium. The reason is that the dynamic
nature of consumption taxation enables the policy-maker to a¤ect the stochastic discount
factor via modications of the marginal utility of consumption. This extra wedge impacts
on the pricing decisions of rms, and hence on ination stabilization, and greatly improves
welfare in the stochastic equilibrium.
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Following the recent nancial crisis, governments around the globe implemented massive scal
plans and a large number of scal reforms. This has contributed to increase the interest of the
economic discipline in scal policy issues. Along this line, this paper tries to address several
policy questions. What are the consequences for the setting of optimal monetary and scal
policies of di¤erent tax arrangements? In particular, what are the welfare consequences of
di¤erent tax instruments? What is optimal size of the public sector and how this optimal size
is a¤ected by di¤erent scal arrangements and di¤erent levels of public debt?
In order to address these questions, this paper studies the optimal mix of monetary and
scal policy in a New Keynesian model where public spending has intrinsic value and the scal
authority can use consumption and labour income taxation in order to nance public spending
and to nance public debt.
The economic environment considered in this paper features three ine¢ ciencies. First, rms
have market power in the good markets which allows them to charge a mark-up over marginal
costs. This causes output to be below the e¢ cient level. Second, sticky prices in the good
market prevent rms from fully adjusting their prices in response to shocks. Third, scal policy
has to use distortionary consumption and labor income taxes to nance public spending and
interest payments on outstanding government debt. Public spending and government debt thus
have additional adverse e¤ects on economic activity.
In order to address our policy questions, we analyze what is the best way of jointly setting
the di¤erent policy instruments, i.e. consumption and labour income taxation, government
spending, public debt and the short term interest rate, in order to deal with the distortions
described in the previous paragraph. In turn, as we will discuss in details later, this model
generates several channels for which there exist non trivial interactions between monetary and
scal policy instruments.
The policy analysis is divided into two main parts. In the rst one, we analyze Ramsey policy
at steady state. We start by showing that in order to replicate long run e¢ ciency monetary
policy implements a zero ination policy. This means that the Ramsey Planner does not nd
it optimal to use steady state ination in order to decrease the real values of prots or to
erode the real value of any outstanding debt/asset position. Furthermore, e¢ ciency requires,
independently from the tax instrument adopted, the Ramsey Planner to accumulate large asset
positions against the private sector. The income from these assets are then used to balance
the government budget constraint and to correct the distortions generated by monopolistic
competition in the good market. This result implies that when public debt is positive, or at
least not too negative, the Ramsey Planner cannot replicate the e¢ cient allocation.
In this second best scenario with positive public debt, we nd that optimal Ramsey policy
calls for extremely high consumption taxation and labour subsidy, well above 100%, as the dif-
ference between consumption and wage income is usually small relative to government spending.
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However, this tax scheme may easily lead to two type of problems. First, a wage subsidy of the
order of 500%, say, seems impractical, as it would lead to tremendously high costs associated in
verifying hours worked. Applying the same logic, a 600% consumption tax rate would probably
lead to a large amount of unreported barter. Therefore we leave the Ramsey Planner free to tax
jointly labour income and consumption when large asset positions can be accumulated against
the public, while in the second best scenario where public debt is allowed to take an arbitrary
(and rather large) value, we restrict the policy maker to tax either labour or consumption.
Under both scenarios, we nd that optimal policy implies zero steady state ination. This
result does not dependent on the long run level of public debt, nor on the degree of monopolistic
power in the good markets. Therefore, the Ramsey Planner never nds optimal to use ination
in order to erode the real value of prots and public debt.
Furthermore we nd that under both scal scenarios, the Ramsey Planner actively uses
government spending as a policy instrument. In particular, we study the optimal size of govern-
ment consumption relative to total output. By setting a certain ratio of government spending
to GDP, the Ramsey Planner can inuence private sector behavior and therefore can reduce
ine¢ ciency and increase welfare. We show that in the present setting which considers homo-
thetic preferences over public and private consumption, the incentive for the Ramsey Planner
to increase the government spending to GDP ratio increases with the householdsrisk aversion.
The intuition for this result is the following. Consider, for instance, the case where only labour
income taxes are available to the policy-maker and assume there is an increase in ine¢ ciency,
due, for example, to more monopolistic market power or higher outstanding debt. This would
push economic activity away from the rst best. The Ramsey Planner by adjusting government
spending to GDP ratio and therefore the level of taxation, can inuence households labour sup-
ply and private consumption and potentially reduce ine¢ ciency. For example, by imposing a
government to GDP ratio lower than in the rst best allocation, the policy maker can sustain
a given level of outstanding debt with lower taxation. Lower taxation increases labour supply.
We show that when consumersrisk aversion is lowthe increase in the labour supply that this
policy brings about boosts private consumption and hence reduces ine¢ ciency. On the other
hand, when the degree of risk aversion is high, an increase in labour supply decreases private
consumption. In this case, the Ramsey Planner has the incentive to set the government spending
to GDP ratio above its rst best counterpart. This policy decreases labour supply and pushes
private consumption towards its e¢ cient level.
A similar logic can be applied to the case when only consumption taxation is available. In
this case, government size, and therefore taxation, directly impacts on private consumption so
that lower tax rates are associated with higher consumption levels. Ceteris paribus, we show
that when the degree of risk aversion is low, higher consumption implies a higher labour supply.
In this case, we nd that the Ramsey Planner sets the government spending to GDP ratio below
its rst best counterpart. This policy boosts both consumption and labour supply and in turn
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pushes the economy closer to e¢ ciency. On the other hand, when consumersrisk aversion is
high, higher consumption is associated with lower labour supply. In this case optimal policy
sets the government spending to GDP ratio above its rst best counterpart.
When we compare the steady state optimal allocation under the two tax schemes, i.e. labour
income and consumption taxation, we nd that under consumption taxation the optimal share of
government spending is always higher then under labour income taxation. Furthermore, we nd
that, for a given level of outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio, there is an enormous welfare gain in
taxing consumption rather than labour income. In turn, we show that these gains are increasing
in the level of steady state public debt and in the risk aversion parameter.
In the second part of the paper we analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy under
technology shocks. First we study the Ramsey dynamics under the assumption that the govern-
ment is allowed to accumulate large assets positions against the public so that the steady state
allocation is e¢ cient.
When the policy maker has access to both labour income and consumption taxation, the
Ramsey solution perfectly coincides with the e¢ cient equilibrium along the transition path.
Hence, the Ramsey Planner can commit to a state contingent policy that perfectly replicates
the rst best allocation. In doing so, the two tax instruments need to move in opposite directions,
i.e. if consumption tax increases, the labour income tax rate must decrease of the same amount.
This policy does not distort the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
and the real wage is free to adjust according to the technology process.1 Furthermore, the
Ramsey Planner must use consumption taxation and the nominal interest rate in order to
replicate the state contingent return in the bond market via the real stochastic discount factor
in the Euler equation, and thereby eliminate any incentive for rms to change prices. At the
same time government spending has to move so that the marginal utility of public and private
consumption are the same.
Then we study a scenario where the Ramsey Planner is constrained to using one tax instru-
ment while the other tax rate is xed at zero but accumulates assets such that the steady state
is e¢ cient. By losing consumption or labour income taxation, the Ramsey dynamics are not
fully e¢ cient any longer, and, as a consequence, households su¤er welfare losses in the stochastic
equilibrium. For example, the policy-maker cannot o¤set anymore the distortive consequences of
a tax change on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. As a result,
optimal policy allows for deviations from full price stability that in turn modify the return in
the bond market. This policy is meant to push the dynamic equilibrium towards the e¢ cient
allocation. While this cannot be completely obtained, under consumption taxation this policy
is much more e¤ective. The reason is that the dynamic nature of consumption taxation enables
the policy-maker to a¤ect the real stochastic discount factor via modications of the marginal
utility of consumption. This extra wedge helps the Ramsey Planner to push the dynamic allo-
1As it is well known, e.g. Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), when prices are
sticky, optimal policy abandons the traditional tax smoothing behaviour.
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cation closer to the e¢ cient one. In turn, the welfare loss of being constrained of keeping labour
income tax xed at zero are roughly 1.6% as big as when the policy-maker is constrained in
keeping xed (at zero) consumption taxation. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there
is very little use of government spending as a stabilization tool in the stochastic equilibrium.
Similarly, when the policy maker is constrained to use only one tax instrument and public
debt is positive, the welfare losses under consumption taxation are much smaller than under
labour income tax. As in the previous case, the superiority of consumption taxation is due to
the dynamic nature of this policy instrument.
This paper links to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, it is closely related
to Benigno and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007) and Adam (2011).
These works also analyze optimal Ramsey policy in a New Keynesian setting and show, as here,
that nominal rigidities prevent the government from using price level changes as an important
source of state-contingent taxation in the presence of nominal government debt. As a result,
government debt optimally follows a near random walk, as in Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al.
(2002). However, none of these works consider the possibility of consumption taxation. An
unfortunate aspect of this restriction, though, is that it rules out a tax rate that is clearly used
by many countries. As reported by Gordon and Li (2009), the average consumption tax rate in
developed countries is around 16% and it reaches 25% in Hungary and Denmark.
Secondly, this paper is related to the optimal policy literature on consumption taxation.
Coleman (2000) studies Ramsey policy under consumption taxation in a neoclassical growth
model. He nds that replacing income taxes with a constant consumption tax leads to a welfare
gain that is only slightly lower than that attained by a dynamic policy that taxes consumption
and income. Correia (2010) extends this result in a setting with heterogenous agents and also
nds large welfare gains in adopting consumption taxation. Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008)
show that in a New Keynesian model with consumption and labour taxation, full price stability
can be achieved via an appropriate mix of labour and consumption taxation. Furthermore,
Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013) show that when the economy is constrained at the
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, consumption taxation may replace the monetary
policy instrument as demand management tool. However, unlike here, they study a framework in
which government spending is exogenous and hence they do not analyze how di¤erent taxations
and public debt levels a¤ect optimal government spending.
We believe that analyzing optimal scal policy with endogenous government spending may
be important for two reasons. First, government spending represents an important share of
GDP of all industrialized countries and it is one of the main scal instruments used by policy-
makers. It is therefore hard to understand how it can be treated as exogenous from a normative
perspective. Second, as Teles (2013) points out, di¤erent assumptions about the endogeneity of
government spending may lead to sharp di¤erences in optimal policy prescriptions and welfare
calculations.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 presents the
optimal policy exercises. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We add a scal policy block to the standard sticky-price cashless DSGE framework, similar to
the workhorse model in e.g. Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003).
Public consumption has intrinsic value for the agents as in Galí and Monacelli (2008), Adam
and Billi (2008) and Adam (2011). Government spending must be nanced with linear labour
income and/or consumption taxes. Lump-sum taxes or transfer are ruled out. We restrict public
nominal debt to be of one-period maturity and to be state-noncontingent as in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2004) and Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008).
Besides presenting the model ingredients, this section derives the implementability con-
straints characterizing optimal private sector behavior, i.e., it derives the optimality conditions
determining householdsconsumption and labor supply decisions, rmsprice setting decisions,
as well as the governments budget constraint.
2.1 Private Sector
2.1.1 Households




tu (ct; ht; gt) ; (1)
where  is the discount factor, ct represents individual consumption, ht denotes hours worked
and gt is government spending. Et identies the rational expectations operator. We impose that
utility is separable in its three arguments and uc > 0; ucc < 0; ug > 0; ugg < 0; uh < 0 and uhh 
0: Where ux denes the derivative of the utility function with respect to the generic variable x.
Furthermore, we assume homothetic preferences over public and private consumption, so that
 guggug =   cuccuc :
There is a continuum of goods, indexed by i: Each i good enters with the same weight in









; i 2 [0; 1] ;  > 1; (2)
















where  2 (1;1) is the price elasticity for di¤erentiated goods.
Households maximize (1) subject to the following period budget constraint









In each time period t, households can purchase any desired state-contingent nominal payment
Qt+1 in period t+ 1 at the dollar cost Ett;t+1Qt+1. The variable t;t+1 denotes the stochastic
discount factor between period t and t+ 1. Here the only role of state-contingent securities is to
dene state-contingent prices. We assume that state-contingent claims are in zero net supply.
Real dividends are denoted by dt, while Bt is the quantity of risk-less nominal bonds purchased
in period t at price R 1t and paying one unit of the consumption numeraire at period t + 1.
Taxes on consumption and labour income are, respectively,  ct and 
h
t , and wt is the real wage.
The solution for the optimizing household problem is standard and it can be written as:
uc;t = t (1 + 
c
t) ; (6)








(1 +  ct)
; (7)
while the Euler equation is
uc;t

















; and absence of arbitrage prots in the asset markets implies
that Ett;t+1 = R 1t .
2.1.2 Firms
A generic good i is produced in a monopolistically competitive market with technology
yi;t = athi;t; (9)
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where ' represents the degree of price stickiness. The prot maximizing generic rm is problem










(1 +  ct) 
1 +  ct+s
!"Pit+s
Pt+s
















We focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which Pit = Pt holds. Therefore, substituting for
mct; the condition for optimal pricing decision is




(1 +  ct) 
1 +  ct+1
# (t+1   1) (t+1)) = 0:
(12)
2.2 Aggregation
In the symmetric equilibrium hit = ht: Hence the economy-wide production function is
yt = atht: (13)
Furthermore, using the households budget constraint, we can obtain the expression for aggregate
prots as
dt = atht   wtht   '
2
(t   1)2 : (14)
Combining the government budget constraint, the denition of prots and the households budget
constraint, one can obtain the aggregate resource constraint as
yt = atht = ct + gt +
'
2
(t   1)2 (15)
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2.3 Government sector
Macroeconomic policies are implemented by two authorities. There is a Central Bank which sets
the nominal interest rates on short-term nominal bonds. Furthermore, there is a government
choosing the level of public expenditures, labor income tax, consumption tax and public debt.
The government nances current expenditure by raising linear labor income and consumption











The scal authority credibly commits to repaying its debt. In what follows we assume that


























2.4 Rational Expectation Equilibrium
Denition 1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium) A Rational Expectations Equilibrium





t ; Rt; gt; bt+1
	1
t=0
that, given the initial level of public debt b0 and the evolution
of technology, solves equations (7), (8), (12), (13), (15), (16), (17) and (18).
3 Ramsey Policy
3.1 First Best Allocation
Denition 2 (Social Planners Program) The Social Planners Program denes the rst
best allocation and consists in choosing fct ; ht ; gt g1t=0 taking as given the technology process
fatg1t=0 ; in order to maximize the utility function of households as in (1) subject to the constraints
imposed by the production technology.








Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.
In the rst best equilibrium the marginal utilities of private and public consumption must
equate to the marginal disutility of labour, where the latter is scaled by total productivity.
This simple allocation rule is optimal because it is equally costly to produce public and private
consumption goods.
Denition 4 (Ramsey Problem): The Ramsey Problem is to maximize (1) over Rational
Expectation Equilibria. A Ramsey outcome is a Rational Expectation Equilibrium that attains
the maximum of (1).
In this policy problem, the Lagrangian multipliers associated with forward looking variables,
i.e. Ett+1, Etuc;t+1; Et ct+1 are additional state variables. Assuming these states initial values
equal to zero implies transitory non-stationary components in the solution to the Ramsey prob-
lem, even in a non-stochastic environment. This is because in the initial period the policy-maker
may have the temptation to temporary increase taxes or generate ination so as to erode the real
value of any outstanding government debt.2 We do not analyze these non-stationary determin-
istic components and concentrate instead on the time-invariant deterministic long-run outcome.
This is what we dene as the Ramsey Steady State (RSS henceforth). This means that we are
imposing an initial commitment on the policy-maker not to generate surprisemovements in
taxes, government spending, or nominal interest rates in period zero. This is standard practice
in the optimal taxation literature, see e.g. Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2004).3
3.2 Analytical Results
As it is well known, there exists a continuum of RSS, each of which associated with an out-
standing level of public debt. In other words, without specifying the steady state level of public
debt, the model displays an indeterminacy of degree one.
Proposition 5 (Optimal Ination): Despite this indeterminacy, all the RSS are character-
ized by







2However contrary to a exible price economy, the Ramsey Planner does not nd optimal to set P0 =1:
3Furthermore, given the presence of sticky prices and state-noncontingent govenrment bond, our primal form
of the Ramsey problem can no longer reduced to a unique intertemporal budget constraint in period 0 and a
feasibility constraint holding in every period. However we could still write our policy problem in terms of a
sequence of intertemporal implementability constraints. For a detailed discussion, see Aiyagari et. al. (2002) and
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
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It is therefore suboptimal to use steady-state ination to reduce the real value of any out-
standing level of public debt or to erode the real value of prots. This is a common result in
the literature that considers this class of models, e.g. Adam and Billi (2008), Adam (2011).
In order to identify the indeterminacy problem, it su¢ cies to recall the rst order condition








At steady-state, the Euler equation implies R = 1 : Therefore, at steady-state, (22) is satised
for any values of 4: Therefore, in order to pin down the RSS one has to x the outstanding
level of public debt such that (22) becomes redundant, i.e. public debt becomes exogeneous at
steady-state. This means that in order to nd the RSS, one can rewrite the (16) as





where ~x = (1  ) b0 represents the steady-state level of real government liabilities. As in Adam
(2011), this modied version of the Ramsey problem in leads to the same RSS as the general
problem in Denition (4) and is used to obtain a number of analytical results.4
Proposition 6 (First Best Decentralized Equilibrium): the Ramsey Steady State and the
Social Planners allocation at steady state coincide under the following necessary conditions
 = 1 (24)
1  h
1 +  c
=

   1 with 






(1 +  c) +
   1

h   1 with ~xopt < 0 (26)
where ~xopt = bopt0 (1  )
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 7 The Ramsey Planner cannot replicate the Social Planner Allocation for a generic
level of outstanding public debt with h 2 ( 1; 1) and  c 2 ( 1;1).
A few things are worth stressing. First, from (25), the rst best allocation requires at least
one scal instrument between h and  c to be a subsidy, i.e. to be negative.5 Second, the rst
best allocation requires negative public debt. Put it di¤erently, the Ramsey Planner cannot
4Formal proof of this can be found in the Appendix B, Subsection 6.5.
5 In particular, if h > 0; then rst best allocation requires  c < 0: However it is possible to nd negative
values of h for which the rst best requires  c < 0: At the same time, if  c > 0; the e¢ cient allocastion requires
h < 0:
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obtain the rst best allocation with a generic level of debt, as this would imply either  c <  1
or h > 1:6
Moreover, using numerical solutions which we describe in details below, we nd that the
policy maker would always nd a marginal welfare advantage in increasing consumption taxation
and subsidy labour when the level of outstanding public debt is greater than ~xopt: However, while
this policy will never replicate the rst best allocation, it would create extreme tax and subsidy
positions.7 Hence, this policy would be extremely di¢ cult to implement due, for example, to
the high costs associated in verifying hours worked. Similarly, a very high consumption tax
rate would perhaps lead to a signicant amount of unreported barter. Therefore, we allow the
policymaker to use both tax instruments when ~x = ~xopt; while under a generic level of steady-
state debt(asset)-to-GDP, we study the cases where the Ramsey Planner is constrained in using
only one tax instrument, i.e. either h = 0 or  c = 0.8
Proposition 8 Under labour income taxation, the Ramsey Planner sets













This proposition shows that it is optimal to set public consumption below the level suggested
by the Social Planner. This is because there exists a wedge between the marginal utility of leisure
and the marginal utility of consumption. This wedge is composed of two components. First,
the monopolistic power that rms hold. Second, the distortive nature of scal policy used
to nance public spending and public debt. By reducing government spending, the Ramsey
Planner can lower the tax rate and hence shrinks the wedge between consumption and leisure.
Moreover, while (28) does not give a precise analytical mapping between ug and uc; we can
nevertheless provide some intuitions about this relationship. Consider, for instance, any increase
in ine¢ ciency, due, for example, to more market power or higher outstanding debt. This would
push down economic activity. The Ramsey Planner by adjusting government size relative to
6Some readers may correctly wonder if this result relies on the absence of prot taxation. As it is well known,
the optimal prot taxation in this class of models is generally equal to 100%, i.e. the Ramsey planner nds
it optimal to conscate all the prots in the economy, see for instance, Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008) and
Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013). We proof in the Appendix that even with the introduction of full prot
taxation, i.e. d = 1; the e¢ cient level of public debt is negative.
7For example Coleman (2000) nds that in a perfectly competitive economy with capital accumulation, the
Ramsey planner would set  c = 692% and h =  692%: Monopolistic distortion amplies even further these scal
positions, i.e. within standard parametrisations consumption taxation is higher than 1000%:
8This is common practice in the literature when optimal policy implies extreme tax positions, e.g. Coleman
(2000), Correia (2010) and Martin (2010).
12
GDP and therefore the level of taxation, can inuence households labour supply and private
consumption and potentially reduce ine¢ ciency. For example, by imposing ug > uc; i.e. a
government to consumption ratio lower than the rst best, the policy maker can sustain a given
level of outstanding debt with lower taxation. Lower taxation would increase labour supply.9
The sign of @c@h determines whether a higher labour supply implies a higher or lower consumption
level. In the Appendix we show that
@c
@h





The sign of (29) depends, inter alia, on the Arrow-Prat measure of risk aversion   cuccuc ;
the degree of monopolistic competition  and the level of outstanding debt ~x: When (29) is
positive, i.e. when risk aversion is low, shrinking the government size (relative to GDP) below
the rst best, allows the Ramsey Planner to increases labour supply and private consumption,
thus reducing ine¢ ciency. The opposite is true as (29) turns negative, i.e. when risk aversion
is high. In this case the policy-maker has a strong incentive to set the government spending-to-
GDP ratio greater than the rst best allocation, i.e. ug < uc: With such a policy the Ramsey
Planner can induce an increase in consumption and therefore reduce the wedge between the
marginal utility of private consumption and the marginal utility of leisure. The desire for such
a policy, i.e. ug < uc; is decreasing both in the degree of monopolistic competition and in the
size of public debt. In the particular case of perfect competition and no public debt, i.e.  !1
and ~x = 0; the RHS of (29) collapses to 1: In this case, if the utility is logaritmic in private
and public consumption, the Ramsey Planner nds it optimal to set the share of government
spending over total output as in the rst best.10
Next we analyze the scenario where the Ramsey Planner has access only to consumption
taxation, i.e. h = 0:
Proposition 9 Under consumption taxation the Ramsey Planner sets





> 1 =) uc > ug
= 1 =) uc = ug
< 1 =) uc < ug
(31)
and ucug is decreasing (increasing) in ~x if   cuccuc > (<) 1: In the special case where   cuccuc = 1;
uc
ug
= 1 for any outstanding level of public debt.
9We are implicitly assuming that the substituion e¤ect on labour supply always prevails, which is consistent
with a La¤er curve in government revenues.
10 In the case of log utility and positive public debt and/or monopolistic competition, the Ramsey planner nds





As under labour income taxation, the Ramsey Planner nds it optimal to set the level of
government spending below the Social Planner level. This is due to the monopolistic features of
the good markets and the distortive nature of scal policy. Furthermore (31) claries whether
the optimal allocation requires the share of government over total output to be above or below
the rst best level. Interestingly, this is now only function of the consumersrisk aversion. If this
is higher (lower) than 1, the optimal government spending-to-GDP ratio is set above (below) the
Social Planner level. By allocating a high share of government spending, the Ramsey Planner
is imposing, for a given level of outstanding debt, a higher tax rate. Assuming that consump-
tion is a normal good, higher taxation implies lower consumption. In order to understand the





  cuccuc   1










In the Appendix we show that the above expression is negative when   cuccuc > 1 and positive
otherwise. This means that when  cuccuc > 1, the lower consumption generated by higher taxation
implies an increase in labour supply, which in turn pushes the economy closer to the rst best.
On the contrary, when   cuccuc < 1; the Ramsey Planner sets uc < ug: The resulting lower taxation
pushes consumption and therefore labour supply upward, i.e. @h@c > 0.
For the same reason, the optimal policy calls for an increase in the government spending-to-
GDP ratio when public debt increases. Moreover, for the particular case in which risk aversion is
1, the Ramsey Planner, independently of the outstanding level of public debt, sets the marginal
utility of private consumption equal to the marginal utility of public spending, as prescribed by
the Social Planner.
A simple comparative static exercise can show that for a given degree of risk aversion and
a positive (or at least not too negative) outstanding debt, the optimal share of government
spending-to-GDP is greater under consumption taxation than under labour income tax.11
3.3 Computational issues
As discussed above, we assume that in period 0 the economy is in the RSS. When an analytical
expression is missing, we rely on non-linear numerical solution algorithms.12 Firstly, we compute
the exact non-linear RSS by using the OLS projection approach proposed by Schmitt-Grohè and
Uribe (2004, 2007, 2012). This consists in exploiting the insight that the Ramsey equilibrium
conditions are linear in the vector of Lagrange multipliers, i. Then, using the perturbation
method proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), we compute the accurate second-order
11Take for instance the case of logaritmic preferences, i.e.   cucc
uc
= 1. Under labour income taxation ug > uc;
while under consumption taxation ug = uc:
12The di¤erent Ramsey problems are described in detail in the Appendix.
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approximation of the Ramseys FOCs around the non-stochastic steady state of these conditions.
We then use this solution to simulate the Ramsey equilibrium in the face of a technology shock.13
The shock realizations and all the other structural parameters used for the simulation are kept
constant through the di¤erent scal scenarios. This means that any di¤erences between scal
arrangements are attributable entirely to the properties of the economic policies. Moreover, we
measure welfare in terms of percentage of consumption units, i.e. $ required by a generic policy























We specify preferences to satisfy the conditions stated in Section 2, i.e.
u (ct; ht; gt) =
c1 t





1   with ;  > 0:
Each period represents a quarter with the discount factor, ; set to 0:9913. The elasticity of
demand is chosen in order have a steady state gross markup of 1:2 ( = 6), which is in line
with the macro literature. Given the importance of the CRRA parameter for our results, i.e.
 =   cuccuc ; we solve the model with a set of values of risk aversion that are generally found in
the literature, i.e.  2 (0:8; 2). However, we set  = 1; i.e. log utility, as a benchmark value.
The utility parameter !h is chosen so that the households supply between one fth and one
third of their time to work in the decentralized equilibrium when the steady-state level of public
debt is zero, i.e. !h = 19:792. We further x !g in order to have in the rst best allocation,
i.e. the Social Planner Equilibrium, a ratio of government spending over total output of 30% ;
i.e. !g = 0:2641. We set the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply  to 1, a value generally
used as a benchmark in the macroeconomic literature, e.g. Adam and Billi (2008). The price
stickiness parameter is selected such that the log-linearized version of the Phillips curve (12) is
consistent with the estimates of Sbordone (2002), (' = 17:4). The quarterly standard deviation
of the technology shocks is 0:6% and it has a quarterly persistence equal to 0:7. Furthermore,
we show the implications of varying the long run level of public debt. Table 1 collects the
parametrization adopted.
13 In the case of e¢ cient steady-state, i.e. when the government is allowed to accumulate a large asset position,
the second order approximation approach gives the same welfare ranking of the correspondent linear-quadratic
(LQ) representation of the problem, see Woodford (2003). For this reason, part of our results are readily compa-
rable with the literature that adopts the LQ framework.
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3.5 Steady State Results
This section explores the quantitative implications of di¤erent scal scenarios for the RSS allo-
cations (with particular focus on the Ramsey public spending) and welfare. In particular, here
we show how the various scal arrangements interact with government spending and long-run
level public debt in determining the Ramsey allocations.
Figure (1) presents the RSS allocations when public debt is allowed to vary from -100%
to 200% of GDP. Increasing the level of outstanding public debt implies an increase in the
(distortive) tax rate and hence a loss of e¢ ciency. Higher taxes imply a lower after tax real
wage. However, despite the consumption tax being higher than the labour income tax, it has
a lower impact on the real wage. This is because consumption is generally more inelastic than
leisure. Hence households respond less, ceteris paribus, to a variation in consumption tax than
to a variation in labour income tax. As a consequence, under consumption taxation the increase
in public debt implies a lower response of the gap variables.
Figure (2) quanties, in percentage of permanent steady state consumption units, the loss
su¤ered by households as steady state public debt increases. Under both scal scenarios, higher
values of steady state public debt imply an increase in ine¢ ciency and hence a deterioration of
welfare. However there is a surprisingly high gain from using consumption taxation over labour
income taxation as a scal instrument. This gain is increasing in the debt-to-GDP ratio, passing
from 24% when government debt to GDP is  100% to 42% when public debt is 200% of total
income. As public debt increases, the scal authority has to devote more and more resources
to pay its burden. Therefore, the lower distortive e¤ects of consumption taxation generate a
relative gain as the ine¢ ciency generated by the burden of public debt increases.
Figure (3) shows the di¤erence between the Ramsey government spending to GDP ratio and
the Social Planner allocation when public debt is at its benchmark value, i.e. 80% of GDP
and we allow  to vary in the interval [0:8; 2] while all the other parameters are kept at their
benchmark values: This gure may be seen as a graphical presentation of Proposition 7 and 8. A
negative (positive) number identies a scenario where the Ramsey Planner sets the ratio between
public spending and total output below (above) the rst best, i.e. gy < (>)
g
y . Under both scal
scenarios, this di¤erence depends critically on the parameter controlling the risk aversion in the
CRRA utility function. In particular, as consumers become more risk adverse, optimal policy
calls for reducing private consumption in favor of public spending. By directly a¤ecting the
size of government spending and therefore the level of distortive taxation, the policy-maker
can inuence labour supply and private consumption and potentially reduce ine¢ ciency. As
discussed above, for a give level of risk aversion, optimal policy under consumption taxation
implies a higher share of government spending over GDP than under labour income taxation.14
Figure (4) presents the optimal public spending rule as public debt increases for di¤erent











degrees of risk aversion. Under labour income tax, the optimal share of public spending is
decreasing in public debt. This is because the strong distortionary e¤ects of higher tax rates
prevail over the incentive of the Ramsey Planner to increase g=y as the degree of risk aversion
increases. This is consistent with (29), i.e. for a given level of risk aversion a higher level
of steady state public debt generates an incentive to reduce the share of public consumption.
Di¤erently, under consumption taxation, the optimal spending rule depends crucially on whether
risk aversion is below or above unity, as presented in Proposition 7. Therefore when  = 0:8; i.e.
  cuccuc < 1; the Ramsey Planner, by cutting the share of government as public debt increases,
can boost both consumption and labour supply. On the contrary, when  = 2; i.e.   cuccuc > 1;
the optimal policy increases the government spending-to-GDP ratio in order to increase hours
worked and therefore total output. Finally, as presented in Proposition 7, in the benchmark
case of log utility in consumption, i.e.   cuccuc = 1; the optimal share of government spending is
always at the rst best, independently of the level of steady state public debt.
3.6 Ramsey Dynamics
3.6.1 First Best Steady State
We now turn our attention to the optimal policy in a stochastic setting. To this end we perturb
the model with a technology shock as described in 3.4. Studying Ramsey policy in the face
of this type of shock is standard practice in the literature (e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004), Correia et al. (2008), Adam (2011), Leith and Wren Lewis (2013) ) and allows us to
better disentangle our contribution. We start our analysis by considering a situation where the
policy-maker implements rst best at steady-state. This implies that the government is allowed
to accumulate large asset positions (i.e. negative debt) and that one (or both) taxes can be
negative. Both these assumptions will be dropped later. We refer the reader to Proposition 5 in
Section 3.3 on how a Ramsey Planner can achieve the rst best in this environment. In practise,
we x the steady state value of consumption taxation to 16%. This value corresponds to the
average level of consumption taxation in the industrialized countries found by Gordon and Li
(2009). Then, the labour income tax rate and the level of the government assets are pinned
down by (25) and (26) respectevely. Here we run three policy exercises. In the rst one the
policy maker can respond to shocks by using both taxes. In the other two, we restrict the scal
authority to use only one tax instrument in the face of shocks. The three scenarios share the
same steady state allocation so that any di¤erence can be attributed entirely to the dynamic
properties of the tax instruments adopted. Results are reported in Figure (5).
When the policy maker has access to both taxes, rst best is attainable in the stochastic
economy under consideration. In other words, the Ramsey Planner can commit to a state-
contingent policy such that in face of a technology shock the response in the decentralized
economy coincides with the Social Planners allocation. Absence economic policy, in a sticky-
price environment a negative technology shock would imply an increase of ination and a positive
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output gap, i.e. price would increase but not as much as required in a exible price world, thus
imply an ine¢ ciently high level of output. As it is well know from Galí (2001), a welfare
maximizing policy-maker would therefore tighten aggregate demand as to push output towards
the e¢ cient level. This policy would also stabilize ination. Here the Ramsey Planner looses
monetary policy on impact and promises to keep it above the steady state level for some periods
after the shock. At the same time, she increases the consumption tax and promises to cut it
tomorrow. As we discuss in more details later, this contingent tax policy represents one of
the main advantages of using consumption taxation as a demand management tool. Indeed, the
combined optimal use of monetary and scal instruments allows the policy-maker to fully control
the stochastic discount factor and hence o¤set rmsdesire to changing prices, thus replicating
the exible price equilibrium.
Furthermore, in order to mimic the Social Planner solution, the Ramsey Planner has to avoid
distorting householdsconsumption-leisure choice. In other words, the policy-maker moves the
consumption and the labour income tax rate in the same measure and in opposite direction so
that they do not create a wedges between the marginal utility of leisure and that of consumption.
Finally the Ramsey equates the marginal utility of private and public consumption as required
by the rst best equilibrium by varying her assets positions. In other words, if the government is
allowed to take large assets position and can use both consumption and labour income taxation,
she can o¤set both the static and the dynamic ine¢ ciencies of the model.
Table 1 reports the models campionary moments of this exercise.15 Given the shape of the
utility function ( = 1), dynamic e¢ ciency requires output, consumption, government spending
and real wages to be perfectly correlated with each other and with the technology process, while
hours worked and ination should remain at their steady state values. These results are closely
related to Correia et al. (2008). They show that with consumption and labour income taxation,
full prot taxation and exogenous government spending, the Ramsey Planner can mimic the
exible price equilibrium, so that any real allocation is independent from the degree of nominal
rigidities. Here we show that the rst best allocation can be implemented without prot taxation
and with endogenous government spending as long as the government is allowed to take large
asset positions.
Next, we analyze scal scenarios in which the government is constrained in using only one
tax instrument. We start with the case where only consumption taxation is available. IRFs are
presented in Figure 4. In this case, while the policy-maker can obtain long run e¢ ciency via
asset accumulation, the absence of labour income taxation makes it impossible to reach dynamic
e¢ ciency. In particular, the optimal tax policy required to balanced the government budget
constraint distorts the leisure-consumption decision, thus creating an ine¢ ciency wedge in the
15Given the quasi-random walk properties of public debt, unconditional moments are not available. Hence, like
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), Arseneau and Chugh (2008) and Nieman and Pichler (2011), we calculate the
campionary moments of the model. In particular we simulate the model 5000 times for 100 periods. For each
simulation we calculate the statistics of interest. Then we report the median value.
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labour supply and therefore in the real wages. At the time of the shock, output, consumption and
public spending all drop by roughly the same amount as the case where the Ramsey Planner
has access to both taxation thus resulting in very small movements of gap variables.16 This
policy, coupled with an initial cut in the nominal rate and an increase in consumption taxation,
is aimed to generate an increase on impact of ination. This helps to reduce the cut in the
government assets necessary to balanced the government budget constraint. As for the case
with two tax instruments, this policy is reverted in the period after the shock. Fiscal policy
commits in reducing consumption taxation while monetary policy increases the nominal rate
above its steady state value. These combined policies a¤ect the real stochastic discount factor
and imply a one-period deation episode, which in turn pushes the price level near its steady
state value.
Table 1 reports the implied simulated moments of this policy experiment. Compared to the
previous scenario, the ine¢ ciency generated by the absence of labour income taxation generates
an incentive for the policy maker to reduce the volatility of output, consumption, government
spending and real wages. However, with the exception of real wages, consumption and gov-
ernment spending are perfectly correlated with output and almost perfectly correlated with
technology. The desire to inate the system at the time of the shock and deate it in the period
after the shock implies a necessary increase in the volatility of ination. This policy generates
also an increase in the volatility of the nominal rate and an increase of its correlation with output
and technology. Interestingly, within this policy experiment, consumption taxation displays a
behavior that is very similar to the case where both taxes are available. Overall, the welfare
cost of loosing labour income taxation is very small, around 0.0015% of the e¢ cient steady state
consumption units.
Finally we analyze the scenario where the Ramsey Planner is allowed to use only labour
income taxation. A novelty of this policy experiment with respect to similar contributions, e.g.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), Adam (2011) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013), is that we
consider optimal labour income tax policy with a rst best steady state obtained via govern-
ment assets accumulation. As before, the IRFs analysis is displayed in Figure (6). As under
consumption taxation, under this scenario, the scal instrument generates an ine¢ cient dis-
tortion in the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. However, now
the policy-maker has less power to inuence the intertemporal allocation via the real stochastic
discount factor. This has dramatic consequences on the optimal policy functions as well as on
the overall welfare. At the time of the shock, consumption, output and government spending all
decrease. However, while consumption and output decrease less than in the e¢ cient allocation,
thus resulting in positive output and consumption gaps, the government nds it optimal to cut
government spending more than in the previous scenarios. This is reected in lower standard
16As in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Adam (2011), consumption, output, government spending, taxes
and debt all follow a near ramdom walk pattern. However, given the optimal consumption tax policy, the long
run values of these variables are very close to their steady state counterparts.
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deviations of output and consumption and a higher volatility of government spending (Table
2). This, coupled with the negative wealth e¤ect on labour supply, allows the policy-maker to
cut taxes and the nominal rate on impact thus inating the system in the period of the shock.
This is done in order to decrease the loss generated by lower public assets. However, the lack
of control on the intertemporal households decisions that consumption tax brings about, forces
the Ramsey Planner to move ination away from steady state only in the rst period and by a
smaller amount, hence generating a lower volatility of ination in equilibrium, and it excludes
deationary episodes. The welfare loss of using only labour income taxation amounts to 0.0914%
of steady state e¢ cient consumption, which is roughly 60 times larger than the scenario where
the Ramsey Planner could use only consumption taxation.
3.6.2 Generic Steady State
In this section we study the optimal policy when the policy-maker faces a negative technology
shock and the economy is a¤ected by a positive level of outstanding public debt. All the
parameters are set at their benchmark values and the public-debt to GDP ratio is set to 80%.
As discussed in details above, when public debt is positive, even with two tax instruments, the
Ramsey Planner cannot replicate the rst best allocation. Furthermore, the second best policy
would imply extreme (and unrealistic) tax positions. Therefore in this section we analyze the
scenarios where the policy-maker can use only one tax instrument. Results of this policy exercise
are reported in Figure (6) and (7). At the time of the shock, under both scal scenarios, output
consumption and government spending all decrease. The dynamic behavior of these variable
are very similar under consumption and labour income taxation. Notable di¤erences across the
two scenarios emerge, however, when considering the optimal responses of ination, nominal
interest rates, taxes, hours and government debt. Similar to the previous case, the optimal path
of consumption taxation implies a sharp increase in the rst period and a decrease in the second
period, while under labour income taxation, taxes increase only in the rst period and by a
much smaller amount. As a consequence, the optimal level of public debt under consumption
taxation increases by less than under labour income tax, thus reecting a smaller incentive of
the policy-maker to smooth taxes across states with variation in public debt positions.
Under both scenarios, ination increases in the rst period. This helps to reduce the real
value of maturing debt. However, the dynamic properties of consumption taxes imply a dea-
tionary episode after the shock which is completely absent under labour income taxation. As
it is well known from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Benigno and Woodford (2004), it
is suboptimal in the presence of even small amounts of nominal rigidities to bring about large
price level changes, i.e. to use nominal bonds as a state contingent source of taxation and
hence to fully smooth taxes across states. This result shows up here in the form of rather small
movements of ination.
Table (3) reports the simulated moments and the welfare calculation of this policy exper-
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iment. As in the case where public debt is at rst best, the optimal volatility of real as well
nominal variables is closer to the e¢ cient response to shock, thus conrming consumption tax-
ation as a better policy instrument even under a positive level of public debt.
Welfare calculations presented in the Table (3) are formed by two elements, the steady state
loss of each scenario and the loss at business cycle frequencies. Two things are worth noticing.
First of all, under both scenario, positive public debt translates in a huge ine¢ ciency in the
optimal response to shocks. Second, even with positive public debt, consumption taxation
remains a better policy instrument when compared to labour income taxation. The loss under
the former amounts to 0.19% of permanent consumption units, while under the latter scal
scenario the system su¤er a loss of 0.44%.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies the optimal mix of monetary and scal policy in a New Keynesian model
where public spending has intrinsic value and the scal authority can use consumption and
labour income taxation in order to nance public spending and to repay the burden of public
debt.
We show that the optimal policy mix is markably altered when consumption taxation is
considered as a source of government revenues alongside or as an alternative to labour income
taxation. We nd interesting di¤erences both in the deterministic and in the stochastic al-
locations. First, we show that the optimal steady state size of the public sector is, ceteris
paribus, greater under consumption taxation than under labour income tax. We further show
that adopting consumption taxation has enormous long run welfare gains and that these gains
are increasing in the level of outstanding public debt. Then we nd that these welfare gains are
not limited to the steady state, but extend in the stochastic equilibrium. The reason is that the
dynamic nature of consumption taxation enables the policy-maker to a¤ect the stochastic dis-
count factor via modications of the marginal utility of consumption. This extra wedge greatly
improves the welfare in the stochastic equilibrium whether the level of public debt is e¢ cient or
not.
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Figure 1: Steady state gap variables with respect to the rst best
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Figure 2: Welfare measure of steady state permanent consumption units.
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Figure 3: Ramsey vs First Best Government Share of Total Output.












Figure 4: Share of government spending to total output as a function of the steady-state public debt.
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Figure 5: IRFs to one standard deviation negative technology shock in the e¢ cient steady state.
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Figure 6: IRFs to one standard deviation negative technology shock with debt-to-GDP at 80%.
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Figure 7: IRFs to one standard deviation negative technology shock with debt-to-GDP at 80%. Gap variables only
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b=y BV=80%. Values range from-100%-200%. First best, see below
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Table 2: SIMULATED MOMENTS
Both taxes (Welfare cost=0) Only consumption tax (Welfare cost=0.0015) Only lab our incom e tax (Welfare cost=0.0914)
x x x xa xy x x xa xy x x xa xy
y 0.2530 0.1078 1 1 0.2530 0.0284 0.9992 1 0.2530 0.0204 0.9283 1
c 0.1999 0.1078 1 1 0.1999 0.0224 0.9992 1 0.1999 0.0148 0.7885 0.9597
 1 0 -0 .1661 -0 .1661 1 0.0036 -0 .1804 -0 .2140 1 0.00096 -0 .7187 -0 .4139
h 0.2530 0 0.6755 0.6755 0.2530 0.0016 0.6741 0.7034 0.2530 0.0113 -0 .7447 -0 .4376
w 0.8333 0.1078 1 1 0.8335 0.0858 0.7241 0.6978 0.8336 0.0826 0.9957 0.9579
r 1.0078 0.0901 0.2703 0.2703 1.0077 0.1059 0.3069 0.3434 1.0077 0.0488 0.3112 -0 .0563
b -11 .5944 0.7736 -0 .9683 -0 .9683 -11.2171 0.8161 -0 .9669 -0 .9766 -11.3841 0.9198 -0 .8610 -0 .8132
 l -0 .3920 0.0759 0.4636 0.4636 - - - - - - - - -0 .2001 0.1189 0.7424 0.4351
 c 0.16 0.0759 -0 .4636 -0 .4636 -0 .1666 0.0750 -0 .4672 -0 .5002 - - - - - - - -
g 0.0530 0.1078 1 1 0.0530 0.0060 0.9992 1 0.0530 0.0075 0.9737 0.8283
Note: E¢ cient Steady-State. Moments extracted as the median of simulations conducted via replicating the
model for 100 periods, 5000times. Welfare loss represented as percentage of e¢ cient steady-state consumption
units conditional to a normalized technology shock.
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Table 3: SIMULATED MOMENTS
Only consumption tax (tota l welfare cost=5.2316% Only lab our incom e tax (tota l welfare cost=6.7705
of which 0.19% due to business cycle uctuations) of which 0.44% due to business cycle uctuations)
x x x xa xy x x xa xy
y 0.2027 0.0221 0.9998 1 0.1960 0.0209 0.9984 1
c 0.1601 0.0175 0.9998 1 0.1570 0.0166 0.9981 0.9999
 1 0.0009 -0 .2893 -0 .2935 1 0.0006 -0 .7185 -0 .6954
h 0.2027 0.0005 0.5774 0.5945 0.1961 0.0012 -0 .1939 -0 .1376
w 0.8333 0.0827 0.9799 0.9787 0.8333 0.0829 0.9965 0.9976
r 1.0078 0.0307 -0 .4758 -0 .4719 1.0077 0.0287 -0 .9903 -0 .9930
b 0.6554 0.1201 -0 .1482 -0 .1293 0.6307 0.1545 -0 .0347 -0 .0813
 l - - - - - - - - 0 .2686 0.0079 -0 .4807 -0 .5237
 c 0.2971 0.0330 -0 .5390 -0 .5459 - - - - - - - -
g 0.0425 0.0046 0.9998 1 0.0390 0.0044 0.9984 0.9989
Note: Generic Steady-State, Public Debt at 80% of Total Output. Moments extracted as the median of simulations
conducted via replicating the model for 100 periods, 5000times. Welfare loss represented as percentage of e¢ cient
steady-state consumption units conditional to a normalized technology shock.
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5 Appendix A-Various Formulation of the Ramsey Programs
5.1 Ramsey Problem: General Formulation both Consumption and Labour
Income Taxes
Following the denition given in the main text, the Lagrangian of the Ramsey Problem when
both tax instruments are available can be represented as:







t [u (ct; ht; gt)] + (34)
+1;t
t
2664 uc;t (t   1)t  


















































where we substituted the wage with its representation in (7), i.e.
 uh;t
uc;t
(1 +  ct) 
1  ht
 = wt: (35)
The rst order conditions with respect to the decision variables ct; ht ; ht; t; Rt; bt; 
c
t and gt are
respectively in order:
ct : 0 = uc;t + 1;t








1 +  ct 1

ucc;t
(1 +  ct)


























ht : 0 = uh;t + 1;t
 
uhh;t


























(uh;t + uhh;tht) ; (37)
t : 0 = 1;t (2t   1)uc;t   1;t 1 (2t   1)
 
1 +  ct 1

uc;t













ht : 0 = 1;t











Rt : 0 =  2;t
uc;t+1 




















   uc;t+1 (t+1   1) (t+1) 




1 +  ct 1

uc;t
(1 +  ct)


























   ct! ; (42)
gt : 0 = ug;t   3;t   4;t: (43)
The rst order conditions with respect to the Lagrangian multipliers, i;t with i = 1; 2; 3; 4 are:
1;t : 0 = uc;t (t   1)t  
"












(1 +  ct)uc;t+1 
1 +  ct+1
 (t+1   1)t+1# ; (44)
2;t : 0 =
uc;t









3;t : 0 = atht   ct   gt  
'
2
(t   1)2 ; (46)





  gt   uh;t
uc;t
(1 +  ct) 
1  ht
htht + ct ct : (47)
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At steady-state we can rewrite the rst order conditions of the endogenous variables, the policy
instruments and the Lagrangian multipliers as:
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h)   
uc (   1)



























(1  h)   c

; (48)
c : 0 = uc + 1





  1ucc (   1) + 2

ucc



















h : 0 = uh + 1

uhh
















(1 +  c) h
(1  h)uc (uh + uhhh) ; (50)
h : 0 = 1












R : 0 =  2
uc







g : 0 = ug   3   4; (53)






 : 0 = 1 (2   1)uc   1 (2   1)uc + 2

uc




























3 : h  c  g  
'
2






  g   uh
uc
(1 +  c)
(1  h)h
h + c c = 0: (59)
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5.2 Ramsey Problem with Labor Income Taxation
The Lagrangian of the Ramsey problem when the policy-maker is constrained to keep consump-
tion taxation xed at zero, i.e.  ct = 0 8t; is given by:







t [u (ct; ht; gt)] +
+1;t
t
24 uc;t (t   1)t  















































The rst-order conditions with respect to the decision variables ct; ht ; ht; t; Rt; bt and gt respec-
tively are:
ct : 0 = uc;t + 1;t









(1 +  ct)
(t   1) (t)
















ht : 0 = 1;t
uh;t 
1  ht
































(uh;t + uhh;tht) ; (63)
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gt : 0 = ug;t   3;t   4;t; (68)
and the rst order condition with respect to the Lagrangian multipliers i;t with i = 1; 2; 3; 4
are:
1;t : 0 = uc;t (t   1)t  
 








 Et [uc;t+1 (t+1   1)t+1] ; (70)







3;t : 0 = atht   ct   gt  
'
2
(t   1)2 ; (72)












At steady state we can write the rst order conditions of this policy problem as:



















g : 0 = ug   3   4; (76)






c : 0 = uc + 1
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(1  h)uc (uh + uhhh) ; (81)
























3 : h  c  g  
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2










h = 0: (86)
5.3 The Ramsey Problem with Consumption Taxation
The Lagrangian of the Ramsey Problem when only consumption tax is available, i.e. ht = 0 8t;
can be represented as:







t [u (ct; ht; gt)] + (87)
+1;t
t
264 uc;t (t   1)t  
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Where, as before, we substitute the wage with
 uh;t
uc;t
(1 +  ct) = wt: (88)
The rst order conditions with respect to the decision variables ct; ht; t; Rt; bt;  ct and gt respec-
tively are in order:
ct : 0 = uc;t + 1;t








1 +  ct 1

ucc;t
(1 +  ct)
















 3;t + 4;t ct ; (89)
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ht : 0 = uh;t + 1;t



















t : 0 = 1;t (2t   1)uc;t   1;t 1 (2t   1)
 
1 +  ct 1

uc;t

















htuh;t   uc;t+1 (t+1   1) (t+1) 




1 +  ct 1

uc;t
(1 +  ct)



















Rt : 0 =  2;t
uc;t+1 














gt : 0 = ug;t   3;t   4;t: (95)
The rst order conditions with respect to the Lagrangian multipliers i;t with i = 1; 2; 3; 4 are:
1;t : 0 = uc;t (t   1)t  










(1 +  ct)uc;t+1 
1 +  ct+1
 (t+1   1) (t+1)# ; (97)
2;t : 0 =
uc;t









3;t : 0 = atht   ct   gt  
'
2
(t   1)2 ; (99)





  gt + ct ct : (100)
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At steady-state, we can write these rst order conditions as:
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(1  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
;
c : 0 = uc + 1




















h : 0 = uh + 1













R : 0 =  2
uc







g : 0 = ug   3   4; (105)






 : 0 = 1 (2   1)uc   1 (2   1)uc + 2

uc








1 : uc (   1) (1  )  (1  )uc
h
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3 : h  c  g  
'
2






  g + c c = 0: (111)
6 Appendix B-Proofs
6.1 The Social Planners Program -Proof of Proposition 3






tu (ct; ht; gt)  tt [atht   ct   gt] : (112)
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The optimal level of consumption, labor and public spending are given respectively by
uc;t = t; (113)
uh;t =  tat; (114)
and
ug;t = t: (115)





6.2 Proof of Proposition 5








  3' (   1)  2
uc















and therefore (117) becomes
0 =  3' (   1) :
Given that 3 > 0 represents the marginal utility of relaxing the resource constraint it follows
that.
 = 1:
6.3 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is done via a comparison between the decentralized equilibrium and the rst best
allocation. First of all, one can notice that in the decentralized equilibrium, part of the output
is eroded by the ination rate. Therefore any e¢ cient steady state allocation need to forsake a
zero ination policy so that the decentralized market clearing condition is equivalent to the one
in the e¢ cient steady state, i.e.
y = h = c + g: (118)





In other words, the marginal utility of consumption equates the marginal utility of leisure. In
the decentralized steady-state the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours
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1 +  c

: (120)





1 +  c

= 1: (121)











1   : (122)











1   : (123)
Now, one can rewrite (121) as 
1  h
    1

= (1 +  c) : (124)





1  h ch  1     1   h  1
1   : (125)
Given that c



















< 0 Q.E.D. (127)
In other words, e¢ ciency requires the government to accumulate public assets, i.e. rst best is
not attainable for a generic level of public debt.
6.4 Proof of Corollary 7
Combining equations (25) and (26), it is straightforward to show that a generic level positive
level of b0 requires in an hypothetical rst best decentralized equilibrium
c












(1 +  c) +

1 +  c
1  h

h  1; (129)
which is possible if and only if either h > 1 or  c <  1:





































On the other hand, if we rewrite h from (25) as
h =





and we substitute it in (26), we obtain
c
h (1 + 
c) +  1

1  (1 +  c)  1

  1
1   = 0; (134)
which implies









   1: (136)
Given that c

h   1 < 0; (135) requires  c <  1 Q.E.D.










  gh + 1


















  gh + 1





1  h  1 ch    1  h  1
1   : (140)
It is straightforward to show that
 
1  h  1 ch    1  h  1 < 0: Hence bopt0h < 0 even in
the presence of full prot taxation. Q.E.D.
6.5 Ramsey Steady State with only Labor Income Taxes (Proof of Proposi-
tion 8)
As discussed in the main text, in order to pin down the RSS, we x an exogenous level of steady
state public debt. By doing this, (67) becomes redundant, i.e. there is no need to take the foc
wrt public debt. Therefore in nding the RSS one can substitute out for the government budget
constraint and therefore eliminate from the Ramsey problem (60) 4: More precisely, given that
4 is indeterminate and therefore unconstrained, there always exists a value of 4; such that,
for a given value of b0 and the optimal monetary policy in place, i.e.  = 1, the RSS allocation








= wt   htwt;
and from the steady state version of the government budget constraint (86)
htwtht = gt + ~x;
we can rewrite the real wage as wt =  uh;tuc;t +
gt+~x
ht
and transform the Lagrangian (60) as










































The rst-order-conditions are given by the three constraints and
ct : 0 = uc;t + 1;t

ucc;t (t   1)t   htatucc;t
'








(1 +  ct)
(t   1) (t)



































  3;t' (t   1) ; (144)




gt : 0 = ug;t   1;t

'
uc;t   3;t: (146)
We can now impose the steady state and obtain 2 = 0 from (145). Using this results in (144),










  gt + ~x
ht
: (147)
Note that since uh < 0 and uc > 0; it follows that
1   + gt + ~x
ht
< 0: (148)
The remaining conditions simplify to





1   + g + ~x
h

  3 = 0; (149)










+ 3 = 0; (150)
g : ug   1

'
uc   3 = 0: (151)
Note that 3 represents the marginal utility of relaxing the resource constraint, therefore 3 > 0:
Moreover, the latter FOCs determine the possible alternative uses of the disposable resources
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such as consumption, labor and government spending. It must be the case that 3 is greater
than all the marginal utilities, namely uc, ug,  uh. Equation (151) therefore implies 1  0.































Therefore we have that ug  uc   uh: Q.E.D.
6.6 Ramsey Steady State with only Consumption Taxation (Proof of Propo-
sition 9)
Here we follow the same approach as for Proposition (8). The Ramsey Planner under the
consumption taxation regime solves the following problem












(1  ) at    uh;tuc;t (1 +  ct)

(ht)





























To simplify matters, following Adam (2011) we substitute the tax instrument using the constant






The rst order conditions of the transformed problem are
c : 0 = uc;t + 1;t
26666664
  (   1) (uc;t + ucc;tct)ht (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x)
 uh;tht (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x) +
 ' (t   1)t (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x)uc;t
 ' (t   1)t (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x)ucc;tct






  (   1)uc;t 1ct 1ht 1 
uh;t 1 (ct 1 + gt 1 + ~x)ht 1   ' (t 1   1)t 1uc;t 1ct 1+
 ' (ct 1 + gt 1 + ~x) (t   1) (t)uc;t+
























h : 0 = uh;t + 1;t
264 (1  )uc;tct (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x) uh;t (ct + gt + ~x) (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x) +
 htuhh;t (ct + gt + ~x) (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x)
375+
+3;t; (155)





ht 1 (1  )uc;t 1ct 1   ht 1uh;t 1 (ct 1 + gt 1 + ~x) +















R : 2;tEt (ct + gt + ~x) (uc;t+1ct+1) = 0 (157)
 :  1;t [' (2t   1)uc;tct (ct+1 + gt+1 + ~x)] +






35  3;t' (t   1) : (158)
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At steady-state we obtain
2 = 0; (159)
so that (158) gives
 = 1; (160)



















(c+ g + ~x)
< 1; (163)
therefore  uh < uc:
Using these results on (155), (156) and (??) it yields respectively








=  uh   3  0 (164)
This conditions implies that 1 < 0:












= 3   ug  0; (165)












= 3   uc  0:
(166)
Summing (164) and (165) we get























=  uh   ug; (167)
since






















it must be the case that
 uh   ug < 0; (170)
and therefore
ug >  uh: (171)
Combining (165) and (166) one obtains
ug = uc   1h (   1) (uc + uccc) (c+ g + ~x) ; (172)
and therefore:
a) If   cuccuc = 1; then (uc + uccc) = 0: It follows that
ug = uc: (173)
b) If   cuccuc > 1; then (uc + uccc) < 0: It follows that
ug < uc: (174)
c) If   cuccuc < 1; then (uc + uccc) > 0: It follows that
ug > uc: Q.E.D. (175)
6.7 Derivation of Conditions (29) and (32)






(w   1)h+ c  ~x

  w = 0: (176)
























































































































> 0: Therefore, the sign of






















The above expression collapses to condition (29)
@c
@h







hence for ~x = 0;  !1; i.e. perfect competition case with no public debt,
@c
@h
 0 i¤   cucc
uc
 1: (183)
As ~x turns positive, or ceteris paribus,  < 1; the LHS of (182) becomes greater than one.
Hence there are values of   cuccuc greater that one for which @h@c  0:
Applying the implicit function theorem to the labour supply condition when only consumption
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  cuccuc   1










which again is negative (positive) for   cuccuc > (<) 1: Note that for   cuccuc = 1; @h@c = 0.
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